Christopher Whiteside and Heather Moody

Siemens Ltd

Dr. Rhena Helmus

Siemens AG

Rail-based systems are exposed to various operational demands brought about either by high mechanical loading or
external influences. At the same time, billions of passengers and freight goods rely on rail systems every day. Safety,
availability, and reliability are key for a competitive rail-based transport. To capture any abnormal behaviour during
operations, data is generated by various sources for a better understanding of interacting phenomena and to prevent
component failure in advance. In order to move forward to a smart infrastructure, insights gained by the analysis of
historical and real time data have to be turned into actions.

Christopher Whiteside and Heather Moody

Siemens Ltd

Dr. Rhena Helmus

Siemens AG

Rail-based systems are exposed to various operational demands brought about either by high mechanical loading or
external influences. At the same time, billions of passengers and freight goods rely on rail systems every day. Safety,
availability, and reliability are key for a competitive rail-based transport. To capture any abnormal behaviour during
operations, data is generated by various sources for a better understanding of interacting phenomena and to prevent
component failure in advance. In order to move forward to a smart infrastructure, insights gained by the analysis of
historical and real time data have to be turned into actions.

Evan Tattersall CEO

Melbourne Metro Rail Authority

Transforming Victiorias Rail Network - Presentation

Francesco Rispoli

Ansaldo STS, A Hitachi Group Company

After relatively long periods of operation, the rise of satellite technology and the importance of its great benefits have at
last been recognised as strategic advancements for the train control system business case especially when operations
are in rural and desert areas. The catalysts are a gained confidence in the reliability of satellite technologies and the
unprecedented plans to put into orbit new satellites during the coming years. Furthermore, after decades of steady
innovation in the telecom networks, 5G offers the ultimate solution with millisecond latencies and “network slicing”
capabilities to realize bespoke virtual networks. For these reasons satellite technologies and IP-based communications
are “game changer innovations” for the ERTMS. This paper aims to assess the satellite technology trends, the Ansaldo
STS projects that in Australia have set the world’s bench mark as the early adopter of satellite technology on heavy haul
lines, and the roadmap to exploit new satellite innovations after the positive field tests in Italy. This plan backed by RFI
(Italian Railways Infrastructure operator) aims to contribute to the certification process to implement by 2020 an ERTMS
innovative solution for regional networks based on virtualization of balises through satellite localization, an augmentation
network, and the upgrade of the communication system from GSM-R to a public telecommunications network.

Francesco Rispoli

Ansaldo STS, A Hitachi Group Company

After relatively long periods of operation, the rise of satellite technology and the importance of its great benefits have at
last been recognised as strategic advancements for the train control system business case especially when operations
are in rural and desert areas. The catalysts are a gained confidence in the reliability of satellite technologies and the
unprecedented plans to put into orbit new satellites during the coming years. Furthermore, after decades of steady
innovation in the telecom networks, 5G offers the ultimate solution with millisecond latencies and “network slicing”
capabilities to realize bespoke virtual networks. For these reasons satellite technologies and IP-based communications
are “game changer innovations” for the ERTMS. This paper aims to assess the satellite technology trends, the Ansaldo
STS projects that in Australia have set the world’s bench mark as the early adopter of satellite technology on heavy haul
lines, and the roadmap to exploit new satellite innovations after the positive field tests in Italy. This plan backed by RFI
(Italian Railways Infrastructure operator) aims to contribute to the certification process to implement by 2020 an ERTMS
innovative solution for regional networks based on virtualization of balises through satellite localization, an augmentation
network, and the upgrade of the communication system from GSM-R to a public telecommunications network.

David Ness

MMRA Rail Systems Alliance Package Director

The Owners Persepective - details of the complexity of the project

Trevor Moore

Signals Standards Engineer, Australian Rail Track Corporation

The first track circuits were developed in the 1870s. These were used on US Railroads. Over the following years they
were used on railways around the world. There have been substantial developments in the engineering and technology
used in track circuits through to the present time. However, after one hundred and forty five years we are still having
problems with reliable operation of the track circuits in some applications.
This paper will examine the type of trains, track circuit configurations and infrastructure conditions that contribute to the
performance limitations of the track circuit. The paper will cover engineering solutions and recent testing to address the
reliable performance of the track circuits.
The issue is complicated and involves the signalling equipment, rollingstock and the track infrastructure. An
understanding of these issues will assist the signal engineer in addressing solutions for reliable operation.

Alex McGrath

Level Crossing Removal Authority (LXRA)

The field of resilience engineering explores the mismatch between a system-as-designed, and the actual system as it
operates in the real world, in the presence of shocks, stresses and resource constraints. In signalling systems, the
modelling of component availabilities into system availability leads to the belief that more redundancy is always an asset;
while in a real operating railway, redundancy has at times been an asset to the system and at other times has increased
cost while also decreasing performance and whole-system safety margins.
This paper explores the justification for component and link redundancy in signalling system design alongside the
legislation and body of research on system resilience. It draws on a series of ideas from the field of resilience
engineering, and real-world rail and signalling examples, to explore the issues. Alarm architecture, lifecycle maintenance
planning, and criticality assessment are provided as concrete guidance for how to design a resilient signalling system.
However, true resilient behaviour depends on the context, organisational culture and human behaviours, and the real
railway as an evolving complex system.

Alex McGrath

Level Crossing Removal Authority (LXRA)

The field of resilience engineering explores the mismatch between a system-as-designed, and the actual system as it
operates in the real world, in the presence of shocks, stresses and resource constraints. In signalling systems, the
modelling of component availabilities into system availability leads to the belief that more redundancy is always an asset;
while in a real operating railway, redundancy has at times been an asset to the system and at other times has increased
cost while also decreasing performance and whole-system safety margins.
This paper explores the justification for component and link redundancy in signalling system design alongside the
legislation and body of research on system resilience. It draws on a series of ideas from the field of resilience
engineering, and real-world rail and signalling examples, to explore the issues. Alarm architecture, lifecycle maintenance
planning, and criticality assessment are provided as concrete guidance for how to design a resilient signalling system.
However, true resilient behaviour depends on the context, organisational culture and human behaviours, and the real
railway as an evolving complex system.

Hugh Hunter

Certifier Australia

Serge Joseph

French and Algerian Ministry of Transport

Regulation of Australian Railways in standardised across Australia and is administered by the Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator (ONRSR).
The ONRSR Major Project Guidelines [21] states that ONRSR expects major projects to engage an Independent Safety Assessor who:
• Is independent from the delivery organisations
• Resources the project based on the scale and complexity of the task
• Use Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) with an appropriate mix of competency, qualifications and relevant
experience for the project scope
State government organisations such as Transport for New South Wales (TfNSW) state in their Guide to Independent
Safety Assessment [17], that new or altered assets requiring “safety significant changes” should be subjected to
Independent Safety Assessment (InSA).
There is a general lack of understanding in the railway industry regarding areas such as:
• What is Independent Safety Assessment, why is it performed and what is its role in a project
• The types of independent assessments that are required to be performed for the fulfillment of different
regulations and standards. This includes the usage of multiple assessment types within a project.
• Can any safety assurance body perform independent safety assessments or do these entities have to be
accredited to perform their various independent assessment types?
• Who performs the accreditation of an ISA and how is this accreditation recognised in different states and
countries.
• Where in the project lifecycle does the ISA become involved?
• How much of a project does the ISA assess, and how does the ISA ensure that the InSA provides a suitable
focus on the areas of higher risk
• How does the ISA work together with the project with regards to observation management and the generation
of ISA reports?
• What does the ISA expect the project team to provide for assessment?
• What are the tools and techniques utilised by an ISA
• The usage of multiple ISAs in project and how an ISA can accept the results provided by other ISAs.
This paper addresses this lack of understanding, providing descriptions of the different independent assessment types,
detailing the role of the ISA, describing the InSA process, and describing the use of accreditation for an ISA and how this
accreditation is recognised throughout the world.

Hugh Hunter

Certifier Australia

Serge Joseph

French and Algerian Ministry of Transport

Regulation of Australian Railways in standardised across Australia and is administered by the Office of the National Rail Safety Regulator (ONRSR).
The ONRSR Major Project Guidelines [21] states that ONRSR expects major projects to engage an Independent Safety Assessor who:
• Is independent from the delivery organisations
• Resources the project based on the scale and complexity of the task
• Use Subject Matter Experts (SMEs) with an appropriate mix of competency, qualifications and relevant
experience for the project scope
State government organisations such as Transport for New South Wales (TfNSW) state in their Guide to Independent
Safety Assessment [17], that new or altered assets requiring “safety significant changes” should be subjected to
Independent Safety Assessment (InSA).
There is a general lack of understanding in the railway industry regarding areas such as:
• What is Independent Safety Assessment, why is it performed and what is its role in a project
• The types of independent assessments that are required to be performed for the fulfillment of different
regulations and standards. This includes the usage of multiple assessment types within a project.
• Can any safety assurance body perform independent safety assessments or do these entities have to be
accredited to perform their various independent assessment types?
• Who performs the accreditation of an ISA and how is this accreditation recognised in different states and
countries.
• Where in the project lifecycle does the ISA become involved?
• How much of a project does the ISA assess, and how does the ISA ensure that the InSA provides a suitable
focus on the areas of higher risk
• How does the ISA work together with the project with regards to observation management and the generation
of ISA reports?
• What does the ISA expect the project team to provide for assessment?
• What are the tools and techniques utilised by an ISA
• The usage of multiple ISAs in project and how an ISA can accept the results provided by other ISAs.
This paper addresses this lack of understanding, providing descriptions of the different independent assessment types,
detailing the role of the ISA, describing the InSA process, and describing the use of accreditation for an ISA and how this
accreditation is recognised throughout the world.

Richard Flinders

Siemens Ltd.

This is a paper exploring the concept of the digital
point machine, or more correctly the effects the
Digital Railway may have on the development of
and requirements for trackside equipment!
The move to a connected system for railway
control will certainly open up opportunities to also
connect the current ‘dumb’ devices but what will
the new scope for this connected equipment be?
Will changes be driven by digitalization or will
commercial and social changes have more
impact?
Will there be significant changes at all?

Richard Flinders

Siemens Ltd.

This is a paper exploring the concept of the digital
point machine, or more correctly the effects the
Digital Railway may have on the development of
and requirements for trackside equipment!
The move to a connected system for railway
control will certainly open up opportunities to also
connect the current ‘dumb’ devices but what will
the new scope for this connected equipment be?
Will changes be driven by digitalization or will
commercial and social changes have more
impact?
Will there be significant changes at all?

Bob Detering FIRSE

Retired

A look at at IRSE Australasia over the last 70 years

Julian Danton

Bombardier Transportation

Delhi Metro is a greenfield development of a 58km heavy metro system with 38 stations and 2 depots, for
which Bombardier Transportation are currently introducing a CITYFLO 650 communications based train
control (CBTC) signalling and control system. The line is a mixture of above ground and tunnel areas,
leading to design consideration of system functionalities required to be able to handle operations in either
environment.
The vehicles on the line are designed to be operated in both UTO (Unattended Train Operation) and nonUTO modes, both above ground and tunnel. The CBTC system functionalities and integration with the
rolling stock have therefore been designed to be able to operate with or without a driver across the different
line environments.
The introduction of UTO requires a CBTC system with a higher degree of automation, including fully
automatic depot storage and dispatch, automatic jog and creep at platforms and automatic handling of
emergencies between platforms including evacuation. It also requires increased remote visibility and control
through the provision of remote access to onboard CCTV at the OCC (Operational Control Centre) and
stations to provide the ability to remotely handle onboard issues for a train in UTO.

Julian Danton

Bombardier Transportation

Delhi Metro is a greenfield development of a 58km heavy metro system with 38 stations and 2 depots, for
which Bombardier Transportation are currently introducing a CITYFLO 650 communications based train
control (CBTC) signalling and control system. The line is a mixture of above ground and tunnel areas,
leading to design consideration of system functionalities required to be able to handle operations in either
environment.
The vehicles on the line are designed to be operated in both UTO (Unattended Train Operation) and nonUTO modes, both above ground and tunnel. The CBTC system functionalities and integration with the
rolling stock have therefore been designed to be able to operate with or without a driver across the different
line environments.
The introduction of UTO requires a CBTC system with a higher degree of automation, including fully
automatic depot storage and dispatch, automatic jog and creep at platforms and automatic handling of
emergencies between platforms including evacuation. It also requires increased remote visibility and control
through the provision of remote access to onboard CCTV at the OCC (Operational Control Centre) and
stations to provide the ability to remotely handle onboard issues for a train in UTO.

Trevor Moore Hon FIRSE FIEA Aust

Australian Rail Track Corporation

We often design a signalling system and continue its operation even though there are significant changes in train operating conditions. Do we assume that is still as safe as the day it was commissioned into service?

Some cases are self-evident that safety has changed. If we increase the train speed over a level crossing we know that the approach warnings have to be reviewed and updated. Do we check and update if they have changed the road traffic classification to B double trucks?

When and how should we review the signalling system for safety of operations? What should be the catalyst to undertaking a review? Should this be part of the standard practice for signal engineers managing infrastructure and for signal designers on new works?
The paper addresses some of the situations that can arise leading to a change in the safety of the signalling system.

Wayne McDonald BE (Elec) FIRSE

Siemens Limited

Railways are required to operate safely and one of the methods to demonstrate this is type approval of signalling equipment. That approval must include documentation of high RAMS (Reliability, Availability, Maintainability and Safety) when applied in vital and even non-vital applications. Suppliers have provided such values, in some form or another, for electrical, electronic and programmable electronic equipment for many years. The limitations and applicability of these values have not always been well understood and they have often been misapplied. The decisions for product comparison or maintenance plans could therefore be compromised or invalid.

More recently, purchasers, and personnel assessing type approval are demanding values such as SIL (Safety Integrity Level) and MTBF (Mean Time Between Failure) for electromechanical equipment and systems. The standards currently used for programmable electronic systems clearly state that using them to derive values for electromechanical is inappropriate.

This paper delves into the importance of understanding and applying meaningful RAMS values for signalling equipment and addresses the inappropriateness of SIL and MTBF for Electromechanical Equipment. It continues to offer some suggestions for how RAMS can be used for Electromechanical Equipment.

Dr Olivier Leveque

Alstom Signalling – Australia New Zealand

The advanced features over ETCS detailed in this paper are Virtual Block Sectioning and scalable Automatic Train Operation. These features can be incrementally implemented to meet the current and future business requirements of a suburban railway operation. A case study is presented to illustrate the performance benefits of a scalable ATO overlaid onto an ETCS solution for a suburban application.

Rob Gillespie NTD Elec Eng.


I&E Systems Pty Ltd

Modern railway signalling systems now incorporate computer-based interlocking, and the wiring is predominantly simple input/output functions, so, is CAD really the best way to design these high integrity systems?